

# Multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical and quantum messages\*

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Accepted on June 8, 2006

**Abstract** A scheme for multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical and quantum messages is proposed by using entanglement swapping. This scheme can distribute not only the classical information but also the quantum information between  $N$  agents. The security of our scheme is also confirmed.

**Keywords:** quantum secret sharing, classical message, quantum message, EPR pair.

Suppose that the boss Alice wants to share a secret key with her some remote agents, and there may be one agent dishonest. She does not know who the dishonest man is, but Alice believes that the honest agents can prevent the dishonest man from stealing the secret information and doing harm to her belongings. For this goal, Blakley<sup>[1]</sup> and Shamir<sup>[2]</sup> independently proposed an original scheme for secret sharing in 1979. In their schemes, the secret key is divided into  $n$  pieces and distributed to  $n$  agents Bob <sub>$i$</sub>  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). Only when all the  $n$  agents cooperate can they reconstruct Alice's secret key  $K_A = K_{B_1} \oplus K_{B_2} \oplus \dots \oplus K_{B_n}$ . Here  $K_{B_i}$  is the key obtained by the agent Bob <sub>$i$</sub> . Because a classical signal can be copied fully and freely by a vicious eavesdropper, say Eve, it is difficult for the parties to create the key  $K_A$  securely only with the classical physics.

The quantum secret sharing (QSS) is the quantum counterpart of the classical secret sharing, and becomes an important branch of quantum communication. In 1999, Hillery et al.<sup>[3]</sup> proposed the first QSS scheme with a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state, called HBB99 scheme. Up to now, many studies have been focused on QSS<sup>[3–23]</sup>, including those for sharing an unknown quantum state<sup>[24–27]</sup>. Recently, Zhang and Man<sup>[22]</sup> introduced a multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) proto-

col of classical messages by using entanglement swapping with Bell states. In their protocol, the boss Alice prepares three Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and uses four local unitary operations to encode the secret messages on one of the three EPR pairs. She sends the two particles in two EPR pairs to her two agents, Bob and Charlie, respectively, and keeps the other two particles. Moreover, Alice should set up an entangled quantum channel for Bob and Charlie with an EPR pair. By performing a local unitary operation on one particle in her hand, Alice encodes her classical message in the quantum states and distributes it to her two agents with entanglement swapping by means that Alice takes a Bell-basis measurement on her two particles kept. Each of the two agents can get the secret key  $K_A$  when the other agent works together with him and each performs a Bell-basis measurements on his two particles.

In this paper, we will present a multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol with EPR pairs. This MQSS scheme has the advantage of using less physical resources.

## 1 MQSS scheme with two agents

An EPR pair is in one of the four Bell states:

$$|\Phi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle), \quad (1)$$

\* Supported by the Major State Basic Research Development Program of China (Grant No. 001CB309308), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 60433050, 10325521), and the Hang-Tian Science Fund, the SRFDP Program of Education Ministry of China

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$$|\Psi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle), \quad (2)$$

where  $|0\rangle$  and  $|1\rangle$  are the two eigenvectors of the measuring basis  $\sigma_z$  (for instance, the polarization of a single photon along the  $z$ -direction). We can transfer each of the four Bell states into another one by operating one particle in each EPR pair:

$$\begin{aligned} U_0 &= |0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|, \\ U_1 &= |0\rangle\langle 0| - |1\rangle\langle 1|, \\ U_2 &= |1\rangle\langle 0| + |0\rangle\langle 1|, \\ U_3 &= |0\rangle\langle 1| - |1\rangle\langle 0|. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

These four operations can represent two bits of classical information 00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively, in quantum communication.

For simplification, we first consider the case with two agents, say Bob and Charlie. Our MQSS scheme works with the following steps:

① Alice prepares two sequences of EPR pairs, say  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ . Each sequence is composed of  $N$  ordered EPR photon pairs in the same quantum state, say  $|\Psi^-\rangle$ . We denote the  $N$  ordered EPR pairs by  $[(P_1(C), P_1(M)), (P_2(C), P_2(M)), (P_3(C), P_3(M)), \dots, (P_N(C), P_N(M))]$ . Alice takes one photon from each EPR pair to form an ordered EPR partner photon sequence, say  $[P_1(C), P_2(C), P_3(C), \dots, P_N(C)]$ , which is called the checking sequence ( $S_C$  sequence). The remaining photons compose another sequence  $[P_1(M), P_2(M), P_3(M), \dots, P_N(M)]$ , called the message-coding sequence ( $S_M$  sequence), being the same as that in Refs. [28, 29].

② Alice sends the two checking sequences, say  $S_{C1}$  and  $S_{C2}$  to her two agents Bob and Charlie, respectively, and always keeps the two corresponding message-coding sequences,  $S_{M1}$  and  $S_{M2}$ .

③ After the two agents received their sequences, Alice chooses a subset of EPR pairs as the samples for checking eavesdropping from each EPR-pair sequence. Alice can complete the process for eavesdropping check with each agent with the method introduced in Refs. [28, 29]. That is, Alice first picks out the positions where the photons will be used to check eavesdropping. She tells her agents which photons are to be measured with one of the two MBs,  $\sigma_z$  or  $\sigma_x$ . After the measurements are done by the agents, Alice performs the corresponding measure-

ments on her sample photons. They analyze the error rate of the samples by comparing their results in public.

If the error rate is by far lower than the threshold value  $\epsilon_t$ , the parties continue their quantum communication to the next step; otherwise, they will abort the whole transmission.

④ Alice encodes her message  $K_A$  on the photons in the sequence  $S_{M1}$  with one of the four local unitary operations  $U_i$  ( $i = 0, 1, 2, 3$ ). Then she performs a Bell-basis measurement on every pair of photons composed of  $P_j(M1)$  and  $P_j(M2)$ , which come from the two message-coding sequences  $S_{M1}$  and  $S_{M2}$ . Here  $j = 1, 2, \dots, N$ . Alice publishes her outcomes of the measurement for each pair.

⑤ If Bob and Charlie collaborate after receiving Alice's information, they can perform a Bell measurement on the two corresponding photons  $P_j(M1)$  and  $P_j(M2)$  which come from the two checking sequences of  $S_{M1}$  and  $S_{M2}$ , respectively. Otherwise, neither of them can obtain the key  $K_A$ .

For example, if the local unitary operation chosen by Alice in step (4) is  $U_3$ , then the state of the photons  $P_j(M1)$  and  $P_j(C1)$  would be transferred into the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle_{M1C1}$ , i. e.  $U_3 |\Psi^-\rangle_{M1C1} = |\Phi^+\rangle_{M1C1}$ . After the local unitary operation, the state of the photons  $P_j(C1)$ ,  $P_j(M1)$ ,  $P_j(C2)$  and  $P_j(M2)$  can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} U_3 |\Psi^-\rangle_{M1C1} \oplus |\Psi^-\rangle_{M2C2} &= |\Phi^+\rangle_{M1C1} \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{M2C2} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (|\Phi^-\rangle_{M1M2} |\Psi^+\rangle_{C1C2} \\ &\quad - |\Psi^+\rangle_{M1M2} |\Phi^-\rangle_{C1C2} \\ &\quad - |\Psi^-\rangle_{M1M2} |\Phi^+\rangle_{C1C2} \\ &\quad + |\Phi^+\rangle_{M1M2} |\Psi^-\rangle_{C1C2}). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

When Alice performs a Bell-basis measurement on photons  $P_j(M1)$  and  $P_j(M2)$ , the state of the photons  $P_j(C1)$  and  $P_j(C2)$  will collapse to a corresponding state. Supposed Alice's outcome is  $|\Phi^+\rangle_{M1M2}$ , then the two corresponding photons  $P_j(C1)$  and  $P_j(C2)$  controlled by Bob and Charlie, respectively, should be in the state  $|\Psi^-\rangle_{C1C2}$  according to Eq. (4). That is, Bob and Charlie can deduce that the local unitary operation chosen by Alice is  $U_3$

and the two-bit classical information distributed is 11.

Different from the Zhang-Man protocol<sup>[22]</sup>, it is unnecessary for the boss Alice to set up another quantum channel for the two agents. The agents can read out the message encoded by Alice if and only if they work together and measure their photons. In this scheme, Alice can prevent a dishonest man from stealing the information by using check mode, the same as the two-step protocol<sup>[28,29]</sup>. So it is also secure against other quantum techniques. Because almost all the entangled states are useful for quantum communication, the intrinsic efficiency for qubits  $\eta_q$   $\equiv \frac{q_u}{q_t}$  approaches 100%, the same as that in Refs. [28–31]. Here  $q_u$  and  $q_t$  are the useful qubits and the total qubits transmitted, respectively. The total efficiency  $\eta_t$  in this scheme approaches 50% as two bits of classical information are exchanged for two qubits.  $\eta$  is defined as<sup>[32,33]</sup>

$$\eta_t = \frac{q_u}{q_t + b_t}, \quad (5)$$

where  $b_t$  is the classical bits exchanged between the parties in the quantum communication. Even though the total efficiency  $\eta_t$  is lower than that in Refs. [17, 18], it is unnecessary for the photons to run forth and back from Alice to her agents.

## 2 MQSS scheme with $N$ agents

We use  $N = 3$  as an example to describe the principle of our MQSS scheme with  $N$  agents.

Firstly, we introduce a complete orthonormal basis of the combined Hilbert space of the three particles as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} |\Omega^\pm\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle \pm |111\rangle) \\ |\Pi^\pm\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|001\rangle \pm |110\rangle) \\ |K^\pm\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|010\rangle \pm |101\rangle) \\ |\Gamma^\pm\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|011\rangle \pm |100\rangle). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

We give the specific steps of the QSDC protocol as follows:

① Alice creates a string  $A$  of  $3N$  random classical bits and divides this string into groups of three bits.

Then she prepares three sequences of EPR pairs, say  $S_1$ ,  $S_2$  and  $S_3$ . Each sequence is composed of  $N$  ordered EPR photon pairs in state  $|\Psi^-\rangle$ . Similar to Section 1, we also denote the  $N$  ordered EPR pairs with  $[(P_1(C), P_1(M)), (P_2(C), P_2(M)), (P_3(C), P_3(M)), \dots, (P_N(C), P_N(M))]$  and form three checking sequence  $S_{C1}$ ,  $S_{C2}$ ,  $S_{C3}$ , and three message-coding sequence  $S_{M1}$ ,  $S_{M2}$ ,  $S_{M3}$ .

② Alice sends  $S_{C1}$ ,  $S_{C2}$  and  $S_{C3}$  to her three agents, Bob<sub>1</sub>, Bob<sub>2</sub> and Charlie, respectively, and keeps the three message-coding sequence  $S_{M1}$ ,  $S_{M2}$ ,  $S_{M3}$ .

③ After all the agents receive their sequences, Alice performs the security checking with the same method in step(3) of Section 1. If the transmission is secure, she will continue to the next step.

④ Alice discards the photons which has been chosen for security checking and picks out three photons  $P_j(M1)$ ,  $P_j(M2)$  and  $P_j(M3)$  from the three message-coding sequences  $S_{M1}$ ,  $S_{M2}$  and  $S_{M3}$ , respectively. Then, according to the corresponding group  $A_j$  in the string  $A$ , Alice encodes her message  $K_A$  on the three particles. For example, if  $A_j = 010$ , then Alice performs a local unitary operation  $U_i$  ( $i = 0, 1, 2, 3$ ) which is previously selected by Alice and her agents on the photon  $P_j(M2)$ ; if  $A_j = 101$ , then Alice performs a local unitary operation  $U_i$  on the photons  $P_j(M1)$  and  $P_j(M3)$ , etc. Here,  $j = 1, 2, \dots, N$ .

After doing that, Alice performs a three-particle GHZ state joint measurement on  $P_j(M1)$ ,  $P_j(M2)$  and  $P_j(M3)$  and publishes her measurement outcomes.

⑤ If Bob<sub>1</sub>, Bob<sub>2</sub> and Charlie collaborate, they can perform a three-particle GHZ state joint measurement on the three corresponding photons  $P_j(C1)$ ,  $P_j(C2)$  and  $P_j(C3)$  which come from the three checking sequences  $S_{C1}$ ,  $S_{C2}$  and  $S_{C3}$ , respectively. According to their measurement outcomes, they can get Alice's message  $K_A$ . Otherwise, none of them can obtain the key  $K_A$ .

For example, if Alice chose the local unitary operation  $U_3$  in step ④, and the corresponding group  $A_j = 010$ , then the state of the photons  $P_j(M2)$  and

$P_j(C2)$  would be transferred into the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle_{M2C2}$ .

After the local unitary operation, the state of the photons  $P_j(C1)$ ,  $P_j(M1)$ ,  $P_j(C2)$ ,  $P_j(M2)$ ,  $P_j(C3)$  and  $P_j(M3)$  can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} & |\Psi^-\rangle_{C1M1} \otimes (U_3 |\Psi^-\rangle_{C2M2}) \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{C3M3} \\ &= |\Psi^-\rangle_{C1M1} \otimes |\Phi^+\rangle_{C2M2} \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{C3M3} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{8}} (|K^+\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Pi^+\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad + |K^-\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Pi^-\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad - |\Pi^+\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Omega^+\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad + |\Omega^-\rangle_{C1C2C3} |K^-\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad - |\Pi^+\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Pi^+\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad + |K^-\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Pi^-\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad + |\Gamma^+\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Omega^+\rangle_{M1M2M3} \\ &\quad + |\Gamma^-\rangle_{C1C2C3} |\Omega^-\rangle_{M1M2M3}). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

When Alice performs a three-particle GHZ state joint measurement on photons  $P_j(M1)$ ,  $P_j(M2)$  and  $P_j(M3)$ , the state of the photons  $P_j(C1)$ ,  $P_j(C2)$  and  $P_j(C3)$  will collapse to a corresponding state. Supposed Alice's outcome is  $|\Gamma^-\rangle_{M1M2M3}$ , then the three corresponding photons  $P_j(C1)$ ,  $P_j(C2)$  and  $P_j(C3)$  controlled by Bob<sub>1</sub>, Bob<sub>2</sub> and Charlie, respectively, should be in the state  $|\Omega^-\rangle_{C1C2C3}$  according to Eq. (7). That is, Bob<sub>1</sub>, Bob<sub>2</sub> and Charlie can deduce that the three-bit classical information distributed by Alice is 010.

It is easily to generalize this MQSS scheme to arbitrary multiparty case.

Assume that there are  $N$  agents, Bob <sub>$i$</sub>  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, N-1$ ) and Charlie, and Alice wants to distribute her secret information among the  $N$  agents. Then, Alice creates a string  $A$  of  $N^2$  random classical bits and divides this string into groups of  $N$  bits. She prepares  $N$  sequences of EPR pairs  $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_N$ . Each EPR photon pair is in state  $|\Psi^-\rangle$ . Alice sends  $S_{C1}$ ,  $S_{C2}, \dots, S_{CN}$  to her  $N$  agents and keeps the  $N$  message-coding sequence  $S_{M1}, S_{M2}, \dots, S_{MN}$ .

After all the agents received their sequences, Alice performs the security checking with the same method as in step ③ of Section 1. If the transmission is secure, they will continue to the next step.

Alice discards the photons which have been chosen for security checking and picks out  $N$  photons  $P_j(M1), P_j(M2), \dots, P_j(MN)$  from the  $N$  message-coding sequences  $S_{M1}, S_{M2}, \dots, S_{MN}$ , respectively. Alice encodes her message  $K_A$  according to the corresponding group  $A_j$  in the string  $A$ , the same as the step ④. After doing that, Alice performs an  $N$ -particle GHZ state joint measurement on  $P_j(M1), P_j(M2), \dots, P_j(MN)$  and publishes her measurement outcomes.

If the Bobs and Charlie collaborate, they can perform an  $N$ -particle GHZ state joint measurement on the  $N$  corresponding photons  $P_j(C1), P_j(C2), \dots, P_j(CN)$  which come from the  $N$  checking sequences  $S_{C1}, S_{C2}, \dots, S_{CN}$ , respectively. According to their measurement outcomes, they can get Alice's message  $K_A$ . Otherwise, none of them can obtain the key  $K_A$ .

In this scheme, we distribute  $N$  bits of classical message among the  $N$  agents with  $N$ -particle GHZ-state measurement. It has a higher capacity. On the other hand, this scheme can save the entanglement resource, too.

### 3 MQSS scheme for sharing an unknown arbitrary $n$ -qubit state

In this section, we will present a scheme for sharing an unknown arbitrary  $n$ -qubit state with entanglement swapping. For simplicity, we will describe the 2-qubit state 2-agent case firstly.

We assume that there are two agents, Bob and Charlie. Alice, the sender, wants to distribute an unknown arbitrary two-particle state between Bob and Charlie. Firstly, Alice has 6 particles, particle 1, 2, 3, 4,  $x$  and  $y$ , in her hand. Particles 1, 2 and particles 3, 4 are both prepared by Alice in the Bell basis state  $|\Psi^-\rangle$ . Particle  $x$  and  $y$  are in an unknown arbitrary two-particles state which can be described as

$$\begin{aligned} |X\rangle_{xy} = & \alpha |00\rangle_{xy} + \beta |01\rangle_{xy} \\ & + \gamma |10\rangle_{xy} + \delta |11\rangle_{xy}, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where

$$|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 + |\gamma|^2 + |\delta|^2 = 1. \quad (9)$$

Alice sends particles 2 and 4 to Bob and Charlie, respectively, and keeps particles 1, 3,  $x$  and  $y$  for herself. After both Bob and Charlie receive the particles, Alice performs a Bell measurement on particles

$x$ , 1 and  $y$ , 3, respectively, and announces the measurement outcomes. Then, if Bob and Charlie cooperate, they can recover the original state  $|X\rangle_{xy}$ .

Let us use an example to explain our scheme in detail. Firstly, we assume that both the EPR pairs are originally prepared in one of the four Bell states  $|\Psi^-\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)$ . Then, before Alice's measurement, the state of the composite quantum system of the 6 particles can be written as

$$|\Omega\rangle_s = |X\rangle_{xy} \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{12} \otimes |\Psi^-\rangle_{34}. \quad (10)$$

If Alice performs a Bell measurement on particles  $x$ , 1 and the measurement outcome is  $|\Phi^+\rangle_{x1}$ , which will occur with probability  $\frac{1}{4}$ , then the state of the subsystem with particles  $y$ , 3, 2 and 4 becomes

$$|\Omega\rangle_{\text{sub}} = (\alpha |0011\rangle - \alpha |0110\rangle + \beta |1011\rangle - \beta |1110\rangle + \gamma |0100\rangle - \gamma |0001\rangle - \delta |1001\rangle + \delta |1100\rangle)_{y324}, \quad (11)$$

and then, the state can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} |\Omega\rangle_{\text{sub}} = & |\Phi^+\rangle_{y3}(\alpha |11\rangle - \beta |10\rangle - \gamma |01\rangle + \delta |00\rangle)_{24} \\ & + |\Phi^-\rangle_{y3}(\alpha |11\rangle + \beta |10\rangle - \gamma |01\rangle - \delta |00\rangle)_{24} \\ & + |\Psi^+\rangle_{y3}(-\alpha |10\rangle + \beta |11\rangle + \gamma |00\rangle - \delta |01\rangle)_{24} \\ & + |\Psi^-\rangle_{y3}(-\alpha |10\rangle - \beta |11\rangle + \gamma |00\rangle + \delta |01\rangle)_{24}. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

Therefore, if Alice performs another Bell measurement on particles  $y$  and 3, the quantum information of the state  $|X\rangle_{xy}$  will be transferred to particles 2 and 4 which are controlled by Bob and Charlie. Suppose Bob and Charlie agree to cooperate, they can recover the unknown state by performing some unitary operations according to the Alice's measurement outcomes. For example, if Alice's measurement results are  $|\Phi^+\rangle_{y3}$ ,  $|\Phi^-\rangle_{y3}$ ,  $|\Psi^+\rangle_{y3}$  or  $|\Psi^-\rangle_{y3}$ , respectively, Bob and Charlie can perform the unitary operations  $U_3 \otimes U_3$ ,  $U_3 \otimes U_2$ ,  $-U_3 \otimes U_1$  or  $-U_3 \otimes U_0$  on particles 2 and 4, respectively, and reconstruct the unknown state  $|X\rangle_{xy}$ .

It is easy to generalize this MQSS scheme to the  $N$  party case. We also suppose that there are  $N$  agents, Bob <sub>$i$</sub>  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, N-1$ ) and Charlie, and Alice wants to distribute an unknown arbitrary two-particle state  $|X\rangle_{xy}$  among the  $N$  agents.

Then, Alice prepares  $N$  EPR pairs in the Bell state  $|\Psi^-\rangle$  and sends one particle of each EPR pair to Bob <sub>$i$</sub>  and Charlie, retains other particles for herself. After all the agents receive the particles, Alice randomly selects one particle from particles which are held in her hand, and performs a Bell measurement on this particle and particle  $y$ , and then she performs a joint measurement on particle  $x$  and the others which held in her hand and announces the measurement results. Hence, if Bob <sub>$i$</sub> s and Charlie collaborate, they can perform a joint measurement on  $N-2$  particles which controlled by them. As a result, the information of the unknown state has been distributed to the remaining two particles. And then, they can recover the unknown state by performing a corresponding unitary operation according to their and Alice's measurement outcomes. If Bob <sub>$i$</sub> s and Charlie do not collaborate, none of them can get the quantum information.

Similar to the above scheme, we can also distribute an unknown arbitrary  $n$ -qubit state among  $n$  agents.

An arbitrary  $n$ -qubit state can be written as

$$|X\rangle_n = \sum_{i_1 i_2 \dots i_n} \alpha_{i_1 i_2 \dots i_n} |i_1 i_2 \dots i_n\rangle_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n}, \quad (13)$$

where  $i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n \in \{0, 1\}$ , and  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$  are the  $n$  particles which carry the quantum information. In order to distribute the above state, Alice will prepare  $n$  EPR pairs and share them with her  $n$  agents securely. Each EPR pair has been prepared in the state  $|\Psi\rangle_{a_j b_j} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)_{a_j b_j}$  (where  $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$ , and  $a_j, b_j$  are the two particles of the  $j$ th EPR pair). Then, Alice sends one particle of the  $j$ th EPR pair, say  $b_j$  to the  $j$ th agent Bob <sub>$j$</sub> , and keeps the particle  $a_j$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). After all the agents receive the particles, the state of the composite quantum system can be described as

$$|\Omega\rangle_s = \left( \sum_{i_1 i_2 \dots i_n} \alpha_{i_1 i_2 \dots i_n} |i_1 i_2 \dots i_n\rangle_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n} \right) \otimes \prod_{j=1}^n \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)_{a_j b_j} \right]. \quad (14)$$

Then, Alice performs the Bell measurements on the particles  $x_j$  and  $a_j$ , and announces all the measurement outcomes. After doing these, the unknown  $n$ -qubit state will be transferred to the  $n$  particles which are controlled by  $n$  agents Bob <sub>$i$</sub> s ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). If and only if all the  $n$  agents cooperate, they

can recover the unknown  $n$ -qubit state. Otherwise, none of them can get the quantum information of the unknown  $n$ -qubit state.

In this scheme, we use EPR pairs to share an unknown arbitrary  $n$ -qubit state with  $n$  agents, and the security of the sharing EPR pairs between two agents has been discussed in Refs. [20, 22, 28–31]. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure.

#### 4 Summary

In this paper we have proposed a scheme for multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical and quantum messages by using entanglement swapping. With our scheme, not only the classical information but also the quantum information can be transmitted to  $N$  agents. The security of our scheme is also confirmed.

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